



ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING BASED UPON CRIMINAL
CHARGES AND HELD BEFORE TRIAL
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
A licensed taxicab driver in the District of Columbia was arrested and
charged with two acts of rape. At the time of his arrest a search of his
automobile and home uncovered a revolver, some ammunition and a
bayonet. After he had been acquitted on one charge, and while the second
was still pending, the responsible administrative agency notified him to
appear at a hearing to determine if his character was such as to justify
revocation of his license.' The agency reviewed all the evidence concern-
ing the second alleged rape and the discovered weapons and, without speci-
fying the particular grounds, revoked his license. The cab driver then suc-
cessfully sought restoration of his license in the district court, meanwhile
gaining an acquittal on the second rape charge. On appeal the circuit
court, with one judge dissenting, affirmed, holding that an administrative
revocation of a license on the ground of a serious offense, upon which
criminal charges were pending, was a denial of due process because dis-
closure of evidence at the hearing may prejudice a licensee's defense
at the subsequent trial. Silver v. McCamey, 221 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.
1955).
The right of a defendant charged with a crime to conceal the elements
of his defense until a strategic moment in the trial developed as one of the
procedural safeguards to counteract the inquisitorial system.2 This right
has been protected in several ways. Although the defendant is entitled to
know the specific charges for which he is indicted, he nevertheless may
plead generally.3 Furthermore, discovery techniques designed to eliminate
surprise in civil proceedings have not been widely accepted in criminal
practice.4 The right not to reveal defense strategy has been criticized on
1. D.C. CODE ANN. §47-2345 (1951), provides that: "The commissioners are
further authorized and empowered . . . to revoke any license issued hereunder
when, in their judgment, such is deemed desirable in the interest of public decency
or the protection of lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of the citizens of the
District of Columbia, or for any other reason they may deem sufficient."
2. See Dean, Advance Specifications of Defense in Criminal Cases, 20 A.B.A.J.
435 (1934). A modern rationale of the defendant's right to conceal the theory of his
defense is that he needs surprise to offset the prosecutor's superior investigative
ability. Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 626, 635-37 (1951).
3: Dean, supra note 2, at 436.
4. The federal criminal procedure rules provide only for limited discovery by
the defendant. FED. R. CRIm. P. 16, 17c; see also Combs, The Scope of Discovery
Against the Prosecution in Criminal Cases-How Far Should It Be Widened?,
42 J. Cl~m. L., C. & P.S., 774 (1952) ; Note, 67 HARv. L. Ry. 492 (1954). English
rules permit a greater amount of discovery on behalf of the defendant. See
Indictable Offenses Act, 1848, 11 & 12 Vlcr., c. 42, §§ 17, 27; ARcHouD, PLEADI NG,
EvlDENcE & PRACrICE IN CI ImNAL CAsEs 412-25 (31st ed. 1943).
(112)
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the ground that it permits the guilty to escape conviction,6 and, conse-
quently, has been somewhat restricted by laws requiring notice of the
affirmative defenses of insanity 6 and alibi.1 It has also been subordinated
to the interests of a plaintiff who brings a civil suit against the defendant on
the basis of the same wrongful acts for which the defendant stands indicted.
Although in those cases the defendant complained that to defend adequately
in the civil suit he must reveal his defense to the pending criminal charge,
a determination to proceed with the civil action was left to the sound dis-
cretion of the trial court.8 In State ex rel. Hurwitz v. North,9 an adminis-
trative agency's refusal to delay a hearing on revocation of a physician's
license pending criminal prosecution of the licensee for abortion was up-
held, the court dismissing the constitutional problem in a single sentence.' 0
The instant case is the first considered opinion on whether a criminal de-
fense is constitutionally protected from disclosure in a prior administrative
proceeding.
The circuit court's conclusion that the revocation hearing in the instant
case violated due process is open to serious question. Since in all the de-
cisions on affirmative defenses and requests for continuances in civil cases
the courts have failed to discuss the right of secrecy, although opportunities
were presented by the constitutional issues raised, it may be inferred that
the right is not protected when there is an overriding interest. Such an
interest is found, in decisions refusing to stay a civil proceeding pending
completion of the related criminal trial, in the need of the civil plaintiff to
secure prompt adjudication of his claim. A quite analogous situation is
presented by administrative hearings like the Hurwitz and the instant cases
where the public interest in prompt adjudication is great. If the physician
is unsuited to continue practice, or if a cab driver is a menace to the public,
then immediate action on the issue is essential. Thus an interest is present
of sufficient importance to subordinate the licensee's right to keep his
criminal defense to himself.
Nevertheless, it is almost beyond question that the instant court was
correct in concluding that suspension was the preferable remedy in this
5. See Perkins, Absurdities in, Criminal Procedure, 11 IowA L. REv. 297, 333
(1926); Comment, 60 Y..E L.J. 626, 638-39 (1951).
6. CAl. PEN. CODE § 1016 (1949), People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 273 Pac. 767
(1928) ; Oan. Rnv. STAT. § 135.870 (1953), State v. Wallace, 170 Ore. 60, 100, 131
P.2d 222, 237 (1942).
7. OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 13444-20 (1938), State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1,
176 N.E. 656 (1931); Wis. STAT. § 355.07 (1953), State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70,
51 N.W.2d 495 (1952).
8. State v. Schauenberg, 197 Iowa 445, 197 N.W. 295 (1924) (injunction of
illegal sale of liquor on facts constituting a criminal nuisance); Lowe v. Lowe,
293 S.W. 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (wife suing for divorce prior to husband's
trial for murdering her lover). Contra, Anthony v. Clarke, 1 RI. 284 (1850)
(replevin-theft situation) ; see also Illingworth v. Coyle, 48 B.C. 81 (1933).
9. 304 Mo. 607, 264 S.W. 678 (1924), aff'd oi other grounds, 271 U.S. 40
(1925).
10. "As to the oral application for continuance, it should be added that there
is no substantial reason for postponing a proceeding like this until after the crimi-
nal prosecution is concluded." Id. at 624, 264 S.W. at 682.
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type of case." Therefore, it is possible that the court found that the revoca-
tion proceeding violated due process, not because the right of secrecy is a
basic and fundamental right guaranteed by constitutional safeguards, but
because suspension was an available alternative remedy. Thus interpreted,
the decision fits more readily into the administrative law problem of what
scope of review a court should exercise over an administrative agency's
choice of remedies. Under administrative law doctrine, the major con-
sideration is whether the fashioning of a remedy is an issue which brings
into play the agency's expertise or one which the reviewing court is more
qualified to decide.12 Therefore, if the instant court decided that the
choice of remedy was an issue peculiarly for the courts, it could have
reversed with directions to suspend the license until the criminal charge
is tried,13 after which the full revocation hearing could be held.14 On the
other hand, if it were determined that the selection of the proper remedy
fell within the scope of agency expertise, the court could have remanded
to the agency for a reconsideration either because the agency abused its dis-
cretion "I or because it failed properly to use its expertise. 16 Either of
these procedures would have obviated the necessity of formulating a new
concept of due process of doubtful validity, even if the instant court was
satisfied that the procedure had violated our traditional concepts of sub-
stantial justice and fair play.
11. Summary suspension would be admirably suited to solve the problem pre-
sented by the instant case. The defendant would not be placed in the dilemma
of choosing either to contest the revocation hearing or to keep his defense secret
until trial, while the public would be safeguarded by preventing the defendant from
operating his taxi until the board could proceed with the revocation hearing after
the criminal trial.
While there is no express authority permitting suspension of taxicab drivers
in the District of Columbia, see note 1 supra, the court did not feel that such
authority was vital. Instant case at 875. Suspension might be permitted under
the provision of the District of Columbia code which authorizes the commissioners
to make ". . . regulations that may be necessary in furtherance of the purpose of
this chapter . . . ." D.C. CoDE ANN. § 47-2345 (1951); cf. LaBonte v. Berlin,
85 N.H. 89, 154 Ati. 89 (1931).
12. See DAvis, ADmsNISTATrvE LAW 893-97 (1951); LANmIs, TnE ADamns-
TRaATriv PRocEss 143-44 (1938).
13. People v. Noggle, 7 Cal. App. 2d 14, 45 P2d 430 (1935); State ex rel.
Williams v. Whitman, 116 Fla. 196, 156 So. 705 (1934).
14. In the instant case, the criminal charges had been tried at the time the
court was reviewing the administrative proceeding. Although the defendant had
been acquitted of the crimes, administrative revocation is not necessarily precluded.
Misconduct need not amount to rape in order to show that a man is unfit to operate
a taxicab. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence needed to convict of a crime is
far greater than the "substantial evidence" standard of administrative astion. There-
fore, the instant court could have reversed the prior order and remanded the case
to the agency for immediate hearing.
15. Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1941) (alternative holding);
cf. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,
313 U.S. 177 (1941).
16. Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
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Criminal Law-
CONFESSION ELICITED ONE HOUR AFTER LAWFUL
BUT VIOLENT ARREST HELD INVOLUNTARY
IN FEDERAL COURT
Police apprehended defendant and two accomplices in a car loaded
with stolen goods. According to the prosecution, defendant resisted both
the original arrest and later confinement at the police station and both
times was forcibly subdued. About an hour after initial confinement,
he was questioned, no force or threat of force being applied, whereupon
he signed a confession detailing his part in the theft. According to the
defendant, the arrest had been peaceful, and the beatings had occurred
during the interrogation. Faced with this conflict of evidence, the trial
court submitted the issue of voluntariness to the jury who found the de-
fendant guilty on three counts.1  Defendant appealed on the alleged error
that the trial court had submitted the issue of the voluntariness of his
confession to the jury in an improper manner 2 The appellate court, ac-
cepting the prosecution's statement of the case, held that a confession
elicited under the facts as presented by the prosecution, was involuntary
and, therefore, should not have been admitted in a federal criminal trial.8
Payton v. United States, 222 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
The problem of excluding an involuntary confession has two aspects:
what is "involuntary" and who shall make that determination? On the
latter point, where the evidence before the court is in conflict, the federal
courts are divided as to whether the judge or the jury should determine
the voluntariness of the offered confession.m4 It seems, however, that in the
absence of any conflict in the evidence the judge alone decides the issue
as a matter of law. Although the record in the instant case indicates there
1. These were housebreaking, grand larceny and carrying a dangerous weapon.
The latter conviction was obtained upon evidence independent of the confession
and was not contested on appeal.
2. The defendant alleged that the trial court, faced with this conflict in the
evidence, erred in not hearing testimony outside the jury's presence, in "preju-
dically" referring to the confession as "signed" by him and in not explicitly in-
structing the jury to disregard the confession if they found it involuntary. Brief
for Appellant, pp. 12-29.
3. In the alternative, the court held that it was prejudicial to accept a guilty
plea from a co-defendant in the presence of the jury and to refer to that plea during
the course of the trial. Instant case at 796.
4. The Supreme Court has enunciated a discretionary rule in tids regard. Wilson
v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896). At least one circuit has held that the
judge alone decides. Shaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955). The
District of Columbia rule requires that, where there is a conflict in evidence, the
issue of voluntariness must be submitted to the jury under instruction to disregard
it if it is found involuntary. McAffee v. United States, 105 F2d 21 (D.C. Cir.
1939). There is a similar division among the states. Annot., 85 A.L.R. 870
(1933). The more subtle variations of this division are considered by Meltzer,
Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Respotuiblity Between Judge and Jury,
21 U. CH. L. REv. 317 (1954).
5. See Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624 (1896) ; Meltzer, supra note
4, at 318, 321-24.
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was a real question of what had actually happened, the appellate court
avoided the necessity of resolving any conflict by accepting arguendo the
facts presented by the prosecution. Since even on these facts the court
found error, the manner of submitting the issue to the jury became imma-
terial, and the only problem remaining is the instant court's definition
of what is "involuntary" as a matter of law.
The criterion for the admission of confessions in federal cases is that
they must have been given "freely, voluntarily and without compulsion
or inducement of any sort." " A similarly abstract standard would seem
to prevail in the state courts.7 Several rationales have been articulated
for excluding confessions not meeting this requirement: traditionally "in-
voluntary" confessions have been considered testimonially untrustworthy; 8
but, recently, exclusion has been strongly supported as a means of con-
trolling particularly repugnant police activities.9 Confessions have been
held inadmissible, on one theory or the other, where they were extracted
by corporal violence,10 or threats of violence," or various psychological
pressures.'2 Where the confessor has attempted to invalidate a confession
on the ground that he was induced by fear generated by lawful acts of force
by the police, state courts have rejected the contention and held that this
is solely a question of weight.'3 The instant case appears to be the first
6. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896); cf. United States v.
Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 38 (1951) ; Denny v. United States, 151 F.2d 828, 833 (4th
Cir. 1945).
7. See, e.g., People v. Schwartz, 3 I1. 2d 520, 121 N.E2d 758 (1954) ; State v.
Walker, 15 N.J. 485, 105 A.2d 531 (1954) ; State v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 81 S.E.2d
193 (1954); 3 WIGMoRS, EViDENCE §826 & n.2 (3d ed. 1940).
8. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) ; Wood v. United States,
128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Patton v. State, 207 Miss. 134, 41 So. 2d 55
(1949). Wigmore makes this the sole test. 3 Wmol.E, op. cit. supra note 7, g-822.
9. See, e.g., State v. Graffam, 202 La. 869, 889, 13 So. 2d 249, 255 (1943).
McCormick accepts this motive as predominant and considers the "trustworthy"
doctrine as only "ancillary" in shaping the rule. McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 109
(1954). The interplay of these motives in the Supreme Court, with each at times
appearing decisive, is discussed in Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411 (1954). Compare Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1953), with Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
10. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
11. Edmonson v. State, 72 Ark. 585, 82 S.W. 203 (1904).
12. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Ziang Sung Wan v. United
States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); Perrygo v. United States, 2 F2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
In many of the cases there may be a combination of threats, force or other pressures.
See Kokenes v. State, 213 Ind. 476, 13 N.E.2d 524 (1938) ; 3 WmoRE, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 833.
13. State v. Wise, 115 A.2d 62 (N.J. 1955) (Defendant, shot during an attempted
escape, confessed a considerable time later, after he had received medical treatment
but before removal of the bullet.); People v. Burwell, 279 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1955)
(Defendant was struck and his arm twisted to speed him past fellow prisoners to
avoid a possible riot; he confessed shortly thereafter.); Roman v. State, 23 Ariz.
67, 201 Pac. 551 (1921) (Defendant, attempting to shoot captors, was shot by them
instead and confessed immediately.) ; Territory v. Emilo, 14 N.M. 147, 89 Pam. 239
(1907) (Defendant, arrested at gun point following an exchange of shots, confessed
upon arrest.); Connors v. State, 95 Wis. 77, 69 N.W. 981 (1897) (Defendant, en-
gaged in cell fight, was clubbed in order to break it up; one-half hour later he
confessed.).
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to hold that even lawful violence, administered without design to secure
a confession, will render it inadmissible if it is obtained soon after the vio-
lence occurred.
The instant court found that, from the facts as presented by the prose-
cution, a compelling inference must be drawn that the confession was not
the "free act" of the prisoner.14 Whether by "free act," the court meant
to imply that the confession was not free from the influences which would
render it untrustworthy, or only that it was not free from an aura of re-
pugnant police conduct, is not clear. On whichever theory of exclusion
the court rested, the result is open to question. To justify exclusion on
the ground that the confession was untrustworthy, the circumstances sur-
rounding its extraction would have to be such as would generally lead the
accused to sacrifice truth for present bodily safety and peace of mind.15
In the instant case, exclusion on this theory could only be supported by
the argument that the force used caused the prisoner to fear an additional
beating if he were not to confess. Absent empirical evidence that such
would indeed be the case, a rule of law assuming that it is seems unwar-
ranted. Concededly, in the individual case a suspect might be so influ-
enced, but this would seem properly a question- of credibility, to be decided
by the jury on the particular facts. Likewise, exclusion in the instant
case would be questionable as a condemnation of undesirable police activ-
ity. Since neither the fact of lawful forceful arrest nor the fact of ques-
tioning a suspect would be considered repugnant, it is difficult to conclude
that a combination of the two would be the more so. In the absence of a
showing of a design on the part of the police to utilize lawful force as a
means of unbalancing the prisoner in an effort to make -him susceptible to
later confessing, there is little to condemn in this conduct. No such design
appears in the instant case; 16 therefore, the court, assuming that it desired
to discourage any such inclination, might well have postponed considera-
tion of the problem pending a case actually presenting the situation.
Internal Revenue-
TAXPAYER'S WAR LOSS DEDUCTIBLE IN YEAR
SUBSEQUENT TO ENEMY SEIZURE
Taxpayer constructed a house in Vienna in 1937 which she used as
a residence and as medical offices for her husband. When she left Austria
in 1938 to come to the United States, she appointed a manager of the
property with authority to rent it; however, no rental payments were
14. Instant case at 797.
15. See 3 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 7, § 822.
16. By accepting the prosecution's statement of the case, there is no question
but that the force actually used was reasonable and necessary to effect the arrest.
Instant case at 797.
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ever received. Subsequently, the Nazi Government seized the property
on the authority of the Act of November 25, 1941, which provided for
confiscation of the property of all Jews who had left Germany or countries
controlled by that nation. In 1944 the property was damaged substantially
by a bomb. The taxpayer, claiming a deduction in 1944 as a result of
the bombing, brought an action in a United States district court to re-
cover taxes paid for the years 1943 to 1946.1 The district court, ap-
parently accepting taxpayer's view that the seizure of her property was
void ab initiola held that she was still the owner thereof in 1944 when the
damage actually occurred and, therefore, permitted her to take a net
operating loss for the years in question. The government appealed, claim-
ing that the loss was deductible only in 1941, the year of the seizure,
either as an ordinary loss under section 23(e) 2 or as a war loss under
section 127(a) (2).8 The circuit court held that the taxpayer did not
come under the war loss provision and that she could claim an ordinary
loss for the year in which her property was bombed.4  Reiner v. United
States, 222 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. not auth., 5 CCII 1955 STAND.
FED. TAx REP. ff 51150.
In general, in order for a loss to be deductible the taxpayer must
show a completed transaction evidenced by an identifiable event, such as
the sale or other disposition of the property,5 in the year in which the
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 122, as amended, 56 STAT. 847-48 (1943), permits
a taxpayer to spread a loss attributable to a trade or business regularly carried on
over a period of years when the loss was greater than the taxable income in the yearin which sustained. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 172 continues the general rule but
has made some significant 'changes. See note 4 infra.
la. This argument was predicated upon an act issued by the Austrian Govern-
ment on May 15, 1946, which declared the Nazi seizures null and void. . Instant
case at 771-72.
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §23(e), 53 STAT. 13 (now INT. Rxv. CoDE oF 1954,
§ 165(c)).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 127(a) (2), added by 56 STAT. 852 (1943). There
is no corresponding section in the 1954 Code. Losses due to wartime conditions
existing after the termination of World War II are deductible under § 23 (e).
I.T. 4086, 1952-1 Cum. BuLl. 29.
4. The second problem the instant court faced was whether the destruction
of taxpayer's property was a loss attributable to the operation of a trade or business
regularly carried on within the meaning of § 122 of the 1939 Code. See note 1
supra. The court-held that the rental of the property constituted a business on the
authority of Anders I. LaGreide, 23 T.C. 50 (1954), and cases cited therein.
Therefore, a casualty loss to such property was a loss attributable to the business.
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. United States, 209 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1954), which
held that a taxpayer who sold property from which rents were received was not
entitled to a net operating loss deduction, was distinguished on the basis of how the
loss arose. The instant court properly decided that, while a voluntary sale of a
business asset was not a loss attributable to a business, an involuntary casualty loss
was. See Note, When Is Real Estate Held for the Production of Income Used
in the Trade or Business of the Taxpayerf', 59 HARv. L. Rav. 119 (1945). Non-
business casualty losses were made fully deductible under the Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 122(d) (5), as amended, 65 STAT. 517 (1951) (now Ixr. Ray. CoDE oF 1954,
§ 172(d) (4) (c)). The sale of business property is now considered a business loss.
INT. Rxv. CoDE oF 1954, § 172(d) (4) (A). See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. 213 (1954).
5. Johnson Drake & Piper, Inc. v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 151 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 292 U.S. 650 (1934).
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deduction is claimed.0 Seizure of property by an enemy sovereign con-
sistently has been held an identifiable event which justifies a loss deduction
in the year of seizure 7 even though there is some possibility of the prop-
erty's recoupment.8 Section 127 was added to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 to obviate the difficulty of ascertaining the actual date of
enemy seizure during World War II and gives the taxpayer the benefit
of a conclusive presumption that his property was lost for tax purposes
on the date of the United States' declaration of war.9 If section 127 is
applicable the taxpayer is bound by its provisions whether or not he elects
to take the loss,' and no deduction will be permitted under section
23(e).-1 In order to come within section 127, the taxpayer must prove
his ownership on the day of the United States' entry into the war.'
2
However, if his property was seized prior thereto, the taxpayer still can
claim an ordinary loss deduction under section 23(e) in the year of
seizure.'3 Until the instant decision, no court has allowed the taxpayer
a deduction in a year other than the year of seizure, if section 23 (e) was
applicable,14 or later than the declaration of war, if section 127 governed.'
In Wackaw Szukiewucz 16 the Tax Court, in a memorandum opinion, held
6. 5 MERTExs, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATiON § 28.15 (1952).
7. Such seizure divests the owner of all right, title, and interest in the property.
See Littlejohn & Co. v. United States, 270 U.S. 215 (1926); White v. Mechanics
Securities Corp., 269 U.S. 283 (1925); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
268 (1870); Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
8. United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co., 274 U.S. 398 (1927); accord,
Eugene Houdry, 7 T.C. 666 (1946); Jacob F. Brown, 18 B.T.A. 859 (1930),
aff'd, 54 F2d 573 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556 (1932); Hector
Fezandie, 12 B.T.A. 1325 (1928); Emil Stern, 5 B.T.A. 89 (1926). Loss of a
United States' citizens' property through seizure by the Alien Property Custodian
was held deductible in year of seizure. Albert F. Gallum, 10 B.T.A. 747 (1928);
Richard B. Wagner, 9 B.T.A. 925 (1927).
9. Ezra Shahmoon, 13 T.C. 705 (1949); Abraham A. Andriesse, 12 T.C. 907
(1949). For a complete analysis of § 127, see Note, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 112
(1944). See also Simon, Presumptions of Section 127, 27 TAXES 791 (1949).
10. Ezra Shahmoon, 13 T.C. 705 (1949) ; Franklin S. Garner, P-H 1951 T.C.
Mem. Dec. 51374.
11. Albert A. Andriesse, 12 T.C. 907 (1949). See also cases cited in note 10
supra.
12. Rozenfeld v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 388 (2d Cr. 1950); David Schnur,
10 T.C. 208 (1948); Benjamin Abraham, 9 T.C. 222 (1947); Eric H. Heckett, 8
T.C. 841 (1947); Ernest Adler 8 T.C. 726 (1947). See also U.S. Treas. Reg.
111, §29.127(a)-1 (1943).
13. Eugene Houdry, 7 T.C. 666 (1946).
14. In the following cases the taxpayer was denied a deduction in a year
subsequent to seizure: Hector Fezandie, 12 B.T.A. 1325 (1928); Albert F. Gallum,
10 B.T.A. 747 (1928); Emil Stern, 5 B.T.A. 89 (1926); Eric E. Franke, P-H
1953 T.C. Mene. Dec. 53116; Waclaw Szukiewicz, P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec.
f 51102.
In several cases the government contested the deduction in the year of seizure,
but the deduction was allowed: United States v. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co.,
274 U.S. 398 (1927); Eugene Houdry, 7 T.C. 666 (1946); Jacob F. Brown, 18
B.T.A. 859 (1930), aff'd, 54 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556
(1932); Richard B. Wagner, 9 B.T.A. 925 (1927).
15. See notes 10 and 11 supra.
16. P-H 1951 T.C. Mem. Dec. ff 51102.
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that a taxpayer whose property was seized by the Nazis in 1939 and later
ceded to Russia under the Yalta Agreement in 1945 could not deduct the
loss in 1945, reasoning that the taxpayer had not retained any semblance
of control in the interim between the German confiscation and the cession
to Russia which would enable him to show a loss suffered in 1945. In
Eric E. Franke' a later memorandum decision, the Tax Court held that
where the taxpayer's farm was confiscated by the Czech Government in
1945, unsuccessful legal action to reacquire the property terminating in
1950 did "not justify the postponement of a loss deduction." Neither the
Franke nor Szukiewicz case was mentioned by the instant court in reach-
ing its decision. Although a memorandum decision is not binding
precedent on a circuit court, these cases appear contrary to the instant
case and should have been distinguished,' 8 if possible, or overruled.
The instant case presents the analytic problem of the desirability of
giving a taxpayer the option of claiming a loss on either of two dates:
the year of seizure or the subsequent year in which the property was
physically damaged. The court's decision rests not on the fact that the
taxpayer's loss was not complete in 1941, nor that there was no identi-
fiable event in that year, but on the subjective feeling of the taxpayer
that the property was not in fact lost. However, in a similar situation
dealing with worthless securities,' 9 the Supreme Court, in interpreting
section 23(e),20 said that the plain language of the statute and the regu-
lations ". . . repels the use of such a subjective factor [i.e., the tax-
payer's honest and reasonable belief as to worthlessness] as the controll-
ing or sole criterion" 21 and imposed an objective standard of when in
fact the loss occurred, as evidenced by identifiable events. This same rule
was applied to bad debts in Rednan v. CommissionerY2 where the court
pointed out that the specific policy of the act was to substitute an ob-
jective standard for a subjective test in determining the year in which
the bad debt loss was deductible.2 Because the code requires the tax-
payer to account for net income on an annual basis, 4 the courts insist
17. P-H 1953 T.C. Mem. Dec. 153116.
18. Szukiewicz may be distinguishable on the basis that the signing of the Yalta
Agreement did not "convert" the taxpayer's property within the meaning of a
casualty, or involuntary conversion, whereas damage by a bomb is undoubtedly a
casualty. Similarly, in Franke, there was no specific identifiable event in 1950 that
compares with a bombing.
19. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945). For other cases dealing
with worthless securities, see Helvering v. Smith, 132 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1942);
Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1941); Keeny v. Commissioner,
116 F2d 401 (2d Cir. 1940); A.R. Jones Oil & Operating Co. v. Commissioner, 114
F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1940).
20. Revenue Act of 1936, §23(e), 49 STAT. 1659. The wording is similar to
§23 (e) of the 1939 Code.
21. Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 292 (1945).
22. 155 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1946).
23. 155 F.2d at 320. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(k), as amended, 56
STAT. 820 (1942) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 166).
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 43, as amended, 56 STAT. 830 (1942) (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, §461(a)). See Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287 (1945);
Cf. Burnett v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
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upon the taxpayer's reporting a loss in the year of occurrence in order
to prevent tax manipulation,2 even though there may be some difficulty
in ascertaining the date of the loss. The facts of the instant case present
a strong case for compelling the taxpayer to claim the loss in the year
of seizure, for the taxpayer knew or should have known that her loss
was deductible in that year.
Also implicit in the court's holding is a distinction between the degree
of ownership necessary to claim a war loss under section 127 and an
ordinary loss under section 23. If the taxpayer was correct in claiming
that the confiscation was void ab initio, then she had title and ownership
on the date that the United States entered the war and consequently
would be subject to the conclusive presumption of section 127.28 If no
credence is given to the "void ab initio" theory,2 7 then it would appear
that the court must reason that the taxpayer did not "continue to have an
interest in the property whose seizure or destruction could be considered
a loss" 28 for purposes of section 127, and yet retained sufficient owner-
ship to entitle her to a deduction under section 23(e) in 1944. However,
such a dichotomy is not apparent from either the language or the history
of the two sections.29
,Restitution-
CITY AUTHORIZED TO RECOVER FUNDS PAID BY
CITY EMPLOYEES TO MAYOR
Frank Hague, while mayor of Jersey City, allegedly extorted fifteen
million dollars from city employees by demanding and receiving every year
three per cent of the annual salary of each municipal employee as a condi-
tion of employment. Jersey City, suing Hague to recover this money,
alleged that the defendant and others, in their capacities as officials of the
City, appropriated the money to themselves in such a manner as to con-
stitute thefts and extortions from the city payroll funds. The City asked
25. De Loss v. Commissioner, 28 F2d 803 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S.
840 (1929). See also Mahler v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1941).
26. See notes 9, 10 and 11 supra.
27. It is believed that this is the better view since at the time of the event the
taxpayer must determine whether he has sustained a loss or not; he cannot rely
on the seizures being held void five years later. Allowing subsequent events to
control the outcome in such a situation would lead to a postponement of the deduction
in the hope of more favorable tax circumstances.
28. See Rozenfeld v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1950).
29. The court in Rozenfeld v. Comissioner, supra note 28, made no distinction
between a § 23(e) loss and a §127(a) (2) loss, and decided that no loss could be
claimed subsequent to seizure. Since the taxpayer was only claiming a war loss
under § 127(a) (2), this case would not be authority for the proposition that no
loss could be claimed subsequent to the seizure under § 23 (e) (3), although the word-
ing points strongly in that direction.
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that this money be forfeited to it for its own use or as trustee for the use
of the employees. Because of the unsatisfactory form of the complaint, the
trial court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.- While the case was pending
before the Appellate Division, the New Jersey Supreme Court, on its own
motion, agreed to hear it. 2 In reversing and remanding, the court ap-
proved at least two theories of recovery: first, the City could recover on
the theory of restitution for its own funds, wrongfully taken by the defend-
ant; or, second, even though the money in question belonged to the em-
ployees, it was forfeit to the City as beneficiary of a constructive trust0
Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1955) (4-3).
That the money taken by Hague should be recovered is obvious. If
the facts alleged in the complaint are true, there has been corruption in a
position of public trust. Some remedy is called for. In the absence of an
alert electorate the usual remedies of exposure, dismissal and criminal
prosecutions are largely ineffectual.4 First, unlike the civil remedy of
constructive trust,0 they are not designed to make the dishonest official dis-
gorge ill-gotten profits." Second, the effectiveness of exposure and dis-
missal is further limited by the community's tendency to forgive and to
forget.7 Third, procedural safeguards limit the effectiveness of the crim-
inal sanction. For example, in criminal cases the defendant's guilt must
1. In granting a motion to dismiss, the trial court characterized the complaint
as ". . . contradictory, ambiguous and confusing . . . [and] completely stultified
by its incongruities." Instant case at 17-18.
2. N.J. Sup. CT. RFv. R. 1:10-1 allows for hearing of a cause by the supreme
court on its own motion.
3. The court may have held also that the money was forfeit to the City as
trustee for the employees. Instant case at 16-17; id. at 22 (dissenting opinion).
But this theory seems inexplicable. By claiming to recover as trustee the City
has in effect alleged that the employees are the beneficial owners of the money.
The employees, therefore, are the proper party plaintiffs in a suit to recover it.
See, e.g., Board of Supervisors of Lunenburg County v. Prince Edward-Lunenburg
County Bank, 138 Va. 333, 121 S.E. 903 (1924). There are no allegations in the
complaint that the employees have declared a trust in their cause of action with the
City as trustee to enable the City to sue on their behalf.
4. Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in Public
Office, 54 CoLuM. L. REv. 214 (1954).
5. The beneficiary of a constructive trust can follow the wrongfully appropriated
property into its product in the hands of the "trustee." 3 ScOT, TRUSTS § 508
(1939) ; RESTATEmENT, RESTUTIoN § 202 (1937). If the property cannot be traced
into any product, the beneficiary has only a personal claim against the "trustee."
Scor, op. cit. supra, § 521.3; RESTATEmENT, RFSTTUTION § 215 (1937).
6. While the police may lawfully seize the fruits of a crime in the possession of
a defendant either incident to a lawful arrest, see, e.g., Cline v. United States, 9 F.2d
621 (9th Cir. 1925) ; 18 CALIF. L. Rsv. 673 (1930), or by use of a search warrant,
see, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921), neither device is useful
in the instant situation. Due to the type of crime it seems extremely unlikely that
the money extorted will be susceptible to seizure as most probably it will have been
invested and mingled with the defendant's other property.
7. See note 4 supra. In 1945 James Curley, who had been forced to pay back
money taken as graft while previously mayor of Boston, and who had been jailed
for violation of the Civil Service Act, and who was then under indictment for mail
fraud, was elected mayor of Boston by a large majority. He was subsequently
convicted of the latter offense. Time, Jan. 28, 1946, p. 23; N.Y. Times, Nov. 7,
1945, p. 6, col. 4; id. Nov. 8, 1945, p. 12, col. 5.
RECENT CASES
be established 'beyond a reasonable doubt, while in civil cases a preponder-
ance of the evidence is usually sufficient for a judgment. In the instant
case, while the defendant's acts seemingly fit within the proscribed defini-
tions,8 the criminal sanction is not available due to the applicable statute
of limitations.9 Even if available, the maximum penalty authorized would
be only one year in jail and/or a fine of $1,000,1° although the possibility
would exist of consecutive sentences for each act of extortion.11 Even
assuming the availability of a criminal sanction, use of a civil remedy is
warranted as an additional deterrent to fraud by municipal officials.
The real problem posed by the instant case is on what legal theory
recovery can be accomplished. Solution of this problem is complicated by
the confusion created by the conflicting allegations in the City's complaint
as to whose money was taken.'2 If it were the City's money which was
wrongfully taken, recovery is proper on the theory of restitution,13 the
court's first holding. However, it seems more probable that it was the
employees' money which was taken.1 4 The court's second theory of recov-
ery is predicated on this assumption.
The court's second holding employs the remedy of a constructive
trust. A constructive trust is a restitutionary device whereby a person
who would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain property
is converted by equity into a "trustee" for the benefit of the rightful owner
of the property.3 Rarely has this remedy been used in cases involving
public officials,'0 and then only when the profit realized by the official was
8. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:170-90 (1953). Defendant may also have violated
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:105-1 (1953) which prohibits a public officer from taking a
fee or reward, not authorized by law, for the performance of his duties.
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:159-2 (Supp. 1954) provides a five year statute
of limitations for non-capital crimes. In general an equity action, such as the
instant case, is barred only by laches, which is an omission to assert a right for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances prejudicial to
the adverse party. 2 PommoY, EQurry JURispRUDENcE §§ 418-19 (5th ed. 1941).
This issue was not raised in the instant case.
10. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:169-4 (1953). If the defendant is convicted under
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:105-1 (1953) (See note 8 .supra), a maximum sentence of
three years and/or a fine of $1000 is prescribed. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:85-7
(1953).
11. State v. Roleson, 14 N.J. 403, 409-10, 102 A.2d 606, 608-9 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 947 (1954) ; Ex parte Benton, 10 N.J. Super. 595, 599, 77 A.2d 517,
518 (L. 1950).
12. Instant case at 17-19.
13. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 1, 130, 138 (1937); see also United States
v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910); Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 122 Minn. 301, 142
N.W. 812 (1913).
14. Instant case at 22 (dissenting opinion) ; Brief for Defendant, pp. 14-15; De-
fendant's Petition for Rehearing, pp. 3-5.
15. 4 Pomsxoy, op. cit. supra note 9, § 1047; ScoTT, op. cit. mtPra note 5,
§ 462, at 2315.
16. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910); Boston v. Dolan, 298
Mass. 346, 10 N.E.2d 275 (1937); Boston v. Santosuosso, 298 Mass. 175, 10
N.E.2d 271 (1937); Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 122 Minn. 301, 142 N.W. 812
(1913).
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made at the expense of the governmental unit involved.I' In cases in
which a municipality has suffered no loss, courts have refused recovery
on the ground that a better right of recovery has vested in some other
party. For example, in Boston v. Dolan Is the court held that the city could
not recover from the city treasurer profits made by him from the misuse
of trust funds belonging to the library corporation. A Kentucky court
denied recovery to a city for fees unlawfully collected by the city treasurer
on the ground that they would be due the parties from whom they were
unlawfully exacted.' 9 But in the instant case it is unlikely that the em-
ployees will sue on their own behalf. This hypothesis seems plausible
because there has been at least a seven year time lapse O without action
and, perhaps, because in the absence of an organization of municipal em-
ployees, there is not sufficient money at stake to make an action by any one
individual economically feasible.21 Furthermore, the employees may be
precluded from bringing suit either because of their participation in the
crime 2 or because of their fear of reprisal by the defendant. Hence, in
the instant situation, the only practicable plaintiff is the City.
Allowing the City to recover, while not consistent witl4 established
precedent on misconduct of municipal officials, is not without reputable
legal support. The Restatement of Restitution declares that a constructive
trust will be imposed on a fiduciary who receives a profit in violation of
his duty to the beneficiary although the profit was not made at the expense
of the beneficiary:ea This view was followed in Fleishhacker v. Blumr, 2 4
17. E.g., Minneapolis v. Canterbury, 122 Mimi. 301, 142 N.W. 812 (1913) (City
officer purchased property and sold it to the city through a third party for an
increased price.) But see United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286, 306 (1910), where
the Court states that a public official who takes any gratuity in violation of his
duty must account to his principal for all he received.
18. 298 Mass. 346, 10 N.E2d 275 (1937).
19. City of Princeton v. Baker, 237 Ky. 325, 35 S.W2d 524 (1931) ; see also
Commonwealth v. Griffy, 208 Ky. 469, 271 S.W. 560 (1925), and cases cited
therein.
20. The complaint alleges that Hague was mayor of Jersey City from 1917 to
1947 and that the extortion occurred throughout this period. Instant case at 9-10.
Thus, the minimum period of inaction is seven years.
21. A class action is probably permissible in this situation. See N.J. Supm.
L. & S. REv. R. 4:36-1; Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F2d 84 (7th Cir. 1941)
(interpreting Fmr. R. Crv. P. 23(a) which is identical with the New Jersey rule).
22. It is not clear from the allegations of the complaint whether the employees
would be barred from recovering in their own. right. The only pertinent allegation
states that "under the laws of New Jersey and the ordinances and resolutions of the
City of Jersey City . . . it was unlawful for any paid employee of the City of
Jersey City to give or pay to any person any money . . . as a condition of ob-
taining or holding such City employment or of obtaining City funds as salary there-
for." Instant case at 10. But no such statute has been found. Brief for Defend-
ant, pp. 30-31; Defendant's Petition for Rehearing, pp. 7-12. The possibility re-
mains of showing either that the money was paid by the employees as a bribe,
which would preclude any recovery by them, Clark v. United States, 102 U.S. 322
(1880), or that the money was extorted by duress because of the unequal bargaining
power between the mayor and the employees, in which case recovery would be
allowed. Clonavor Realty Co. v. Unscheid, 129 N.J.L. 247, 29 A.2d 179 (Sup. Ct.
1942).
23. ISTAT mENT, RasTrrumoly § 197, comment c (1937).
24. 109 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1940).
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where it was held that a bonus paid to a bank officer for procuring loans
belongs to tl-e bank, even though it had suffered no loss. Similarly, an
English court has allowed the Crown to recover illegal profits even though
it had suffered no loss.2 5 The instant court, in ignoring the possibility of
a better right to recovery vested in the employees, has reached an ap-
propriate result.26 Although the municipality can show no compensable loss,
it would appear to have the right to recover on the rationale that there
has been a breach of duty owed to the electorate by the mayor as an
elected official. The exact nature of this duty is unclear. It is described
as an obligation to serve the public with the highest fidelity.27 Since the
instant case was decided on demurrer, it can be assumed, as alleged in
the complaint, that the defendant extorted in Wris capacity as mayor and
thereby breached this duty by abusing his position 8 The City, if it re-
covers, is vindicating the public interest which it represents.
Workmen's Compensation-
WORKING MEMBER OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ASSOCIATION HELD "EMPLOYEE" WITHIN MEANING
OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.
Petitioner was a member and officer of a limited partnership associa-
tion,1 and devoted a small portion of his working time to executive duties.
2
He was also employed as a lathe operator by the association at a regular
25. Reading v. Attorney General, [1951] A.C. 507, 65 HAv. L. REv. 502 (1952).
An army sergeant rode on lorries containing contraband in order to enable them to
pass Egyptian police. For so doing he received ; 20,000, which the Crown confiscated.
On a petition of right to recover the money, it was held. that the Crown was en-
titled to it.
26. Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1952), which provides that any profit made by "insider trading"
may be recovered by the corporation whose stock was being traded. This act is
contrary to the common law which, when it permitted recovery, made the stock-
holder the proper party plaintiff. Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers
and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MicH. L. REv.
133, 148-49 (1939).
27. See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 474-77, 86 A.2d 201, 221-
23 (1952), and cases cited therein.
28. If, as is alternatively alleged in the complaint, the defendant extorted in
his capacity as an individual, the theory of abuse of position does not apply. There
must be a connection between the agent's duties and the transaction in which he
sought to profit in order for the remedy of construtive trust to be appropriate.
Goldberg's Corp. v. Goldberg Realty & Investment Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 415, 425, 36
A.2d 122, 128 (Ch. 1944).
1. N.J. REv. STAT. §§42:3-1 to 13 (1937) govern the formation of a limited
partnership association, of which the distinguishing features are: management by
elected officers, not by the partners as such; ability to own real estate, execute bonds,
and to sue and be sued in the association name; and the limitation of the liability
of all its members to the unpaid portion of their subscription to capital.
2. The record indicates only the stipulation that petitioner was a "workman."
Information as to petitioner's actual duties and activities was obtained from counsel.
Letter from Martin Simon, counsel for petitioner, to the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Sept. 21, 1955, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsyl-
vania Law School.
1955]
126 UNIVERSITY OF PENN SYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
hourly wage. He sustained an injury in lifting a piece of steel while work-
ing at his lathe and sought compensation under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.3 The lower court held that he was not an employee within
the meaning of the act.4 On appeal, the court reversed, holding that peti-
tioner was such an employee and, therefore, compensation should have been
granted. Carle v. Carle Tool & Engineering Co., 114 A.2d 738 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1955).
Generally, individuals who carry out the managerial powers of a cor-
poration are identified as employers while exercising those powers and,
therefore, not covered by the workmen's compensation laws. 5 But since a
corporation is a legal entity which in itself can be regarded as an employer,
its officers or stockholders, who perform duties of a non-executive nature
for the corporation, qualify as employees under compensation law.6 Thus,
a corporation officer has been granted compensation as an employee when
injured while doing mining labor,1 working as a shop foreman," acting as
a salesman,9 running a can-capping machine,'0 or milking cows." But,
when injured while doing work in his executive capacity compensation has
been refused. 12  On the other hand, almost every state 13 which has dealt
judicially' 4 with the status of working partners of a general partnership
3. N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:15-36 (1937).
4. Carle v. Carle Tool & Engineering Co., 33 N.J. Super. 469, 110 A.2d 568
(County Ct. 1954).
5. See LARSON, WoRKMN's COMENSATION § 54.21 (1952).
6. Annot., 81 A.L.R. 644 (1932); see ScHNEIDER, WoRxms's COMPENSATION
§ 798 (1943); LARSON, op. cit. mspra note 5, §§ 5421, 54.22.
7. Mount Pleasant Mining Corp. v. Vermeulen, 117 Ind. App. 33, 65 N.E.2d
642 (1946).
8. Adam Black & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas, 8 N.J. Misc. 442, 150
AtI. 672 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
9. Eagleson v. Harry G. Preston Co., 265 Pa. 397, 109 Atl. 154 (1919).
10. Columbia Cas. Co. v. Industrial Conm'n, 200 Wis. 8, 227 N.W. 292 (1929).
11. Staples v. Henderson Jersey Farms, Inc., 181 So. 48 (La. Ct. App. 1938).
12. E.g., Kutil v. Floyd Valley Mfg. Co., 205 Iowa 967, 218 N.W. 613 (1928);
Higgins v. Bates Street Shirt Co., 129 Me. 6, 149 Atl. 147 (1930); Donaldson v.
William H. B. Donaldson Co., 176 Minn. 422, 223 N.W. 772 (1929); Gassoway v.
Gassoway & Owen, 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120 (1942); Carville v. A. F. Bornot
& Co., 288 Pa. 104, 135 Atl. 652 (1927).
13. The dissenting states are Oklahoma, which has long held that an individual
can be both a member of a partnership and an employee of that partnership,
Ohio Drilling Co. v. State Industrial Comm'n, 86 Okla. 139, 207 Pac. 314 (1922),
and Louisiana, which recently overruled its previous decisions and held that under
civil-law concepts, a partnership can be considered as a separate entity for the
purposes of the compensation act, Trappey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 77
So. 2d 183 (La. Ct App. 1954), cert. granted, La. Sup. Ct, Feb. 14, 1955. The
Trappey case overruled Dezendorf v. National Cas. Co., 171 So. 160 (La. Ct. App.
1936) and Harper v. Ragus, 62 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 1952).
14. Various types of statutes enabling working partners to be eligible for
workmen's compensation have been enacted as follows: CAL. LABOR CODE § 3359
(1947); MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 411.7 (Supp. 1952); Nm. Comp. LAws §2680.10(d)
(Supp. 1949); ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.128 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-43(4)
(1953); WASH. REv. CODE § 51.32.030 (1951).
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has held that they cannot be considered as employees.' 5 This difference in
treatment is presumably due to two factors. 16 First, a general partnership,
except for a few specific purposes, is not an entity separate from its mem-
bers, so that a partner-employee would also be an employer, a dual status
not within the contemplation of the compensation act. Stronger than this
conceptual difficulty is the fact that by law each member has an equal
share in the management, and therefore has actual possession of the powers
of the employer, unless contracted away. In contrast to both a corporation
and a partnership stands a limited partnership association, which contains
certain features of each. The instant court decided that for the purpose of
workmen's compensation a limited partnership can be treated like a cor-
poration, thereby enabling the working limited partner to be given employee
status. Though the case at hand is one of first impression, it reaches a
result similar to that of an Idaho mining partnership case, in which the
mining partner's lack of right to participation in management was an im-
portant factor in enabling him to collect compensation.'
7
It is generally agreed that the purpose of the compensation act is to
require industry to carry a fair share of the burden of personal injury
suffered by employees, arising out of and in the course of their employ-
ment.'18 It seems that in dealing with the "employee" status of a part-
owner or officer of a business organization, the courts have generally be-
come enmeshed in technical concepts not at all in line with the usual liberal
construction of the compensation act. The instant court sought at great
length to classify, for the purpose of workmen's compensation, a limited
partnership association as a corporation instead of as a partnership, though
it is admittedly neither. It would seem that whether or not the petitioner
is entitled to compensation should be determined by a more rational test
than the classification of the business organization with which he is asso-
ciated. The following factors should merit consideration: type of services
performed, control to which the individual is subject in his activities, the
share in the daily management of the enterprise exercised by the individual,
and whether his compensation is primarily dependent upon a share of the
15. E.g., Brinkley Heavy Hauling Co. v. Youngman, 264 S.W.2d 409 (Ark.
1954); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Neal, 188 Ga. 105, 3 S.E.2d 80
(1939); Pederson v. Pederson, 229 Minn. 460, 39 N.W2d 893 (1949); Rasmussen
v. Trico Feed Mills, 148 Neb. 855, 29 N.W.2d 641 (1947); Lyle v. H. R. Lyle
Cider & Vinegar Co., 243 N.Y. 257, 153 N.E. 67 (1926). The leading English
decision is Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co., [1905] 1 K.B. 324.
16. LARsoN, op. cit. suPra note 5, §§ 54.31, 54.32.
17. Albertini v. Hull Lease, 54 Idaho 30, 28 P.2d 205 (1933). In a mining part-
nership, which exists not because of agreement but because of joint ownership and
the working of a mine, the individual as such has no share in the management,
which is controlled by the majority in interest. But see Cooper v. Industrial Acci-
dent Conu'n, 177 Cal. 685, 171 Pac. 684 (1918).
18. See Bowser v. State Industrial Accident Comm'n, 182 Ore. 42, 185 P.2d
891 (1947), citing the preamble to Oregon's Workmen's Compensation Law, Opx.
Rxv. STAT. § 656.004 (1953); Carpenter v. Globe Indemnity Co., 65 R.I. 194, 14
A.2d 235 (1940); King v. Western Electric Co., 122 N.J.L. 442, 5 A.2d 490 (Sup.
Ct. 1939); cases cited in ScnaDmR, op. cit. supra note 6, § 3 n.9. See also SoMERs,
WORKMN'S COMPENSATI N 281-84 (1954).
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profits or upon a fixed wage. Use of these criteria would enable the courts
to ascertain the individuals whose protection would seem to be within the
contemplation of the act. As in the past, compensation could be refused
to the entrepreneur, who retains a large share of the control of the enter-
prise, performs work mainly of an executive nature, and derives the main
source of his income from the profits of the business rather than from
earned wages. These criteria applied to the facts of the instant case present
an individual worthy of compensation: although he has a share in the
ownership of the enterprise and some executive duties, he has little control
over the business, receives a regular wage regardless of profit, primarily
performs work of a non-executive nature, and thus is subject to the same
risks and has the same need for protection as any other individual covered
by the act. Although most cases would not fall exactly into either classifica-
tion, it would seem advisable for courts to orient their thinking along the
suggested lines. In cases dealing with working partners, the courts have
overlooked the above factors and concentrated on the lack of a separate
entity to serve as employer. Though this latter point might have been im-
portant when the common law required an act or omission on the part of
the employer as a condition for his liability,'9 modern compensation law
is not based on common-law liability s ° but rather on public policy and
humanitarian purposes. The employer's liability exists merely because an
individual has been injured in the course of his employment.21 The instant
court reached an appropriate result, but neglected an opportunity to estab-
lish standards for the determination of the existence of the employment
relationship, which, when utilized, would better effectuate the purpose of
the compensation act.
19. See SomERs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 17-21.
20. See SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 6, § 4.
21. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923); McGregor &
Pickett v. Arrington, 175 S.W.2d 210 (Ark. 1943); Brinkley Heavy Hauling Co.
v. Youngman, 264 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Ark. 1954) (dissenting opinion); see LtAsox,
op. cit. supra note 5, §§2.10, 2.20; SoERs, op. cit. supra note 18, at 28-29.
